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To be successful and to gain support by their reference groups, managers back 
their decisions by arguments. These managerial argumentations mirror the 
thoroughness of the decision preparation. In short, they reveal the decision’s 
argumentation rationality. Obviously, the argumentation rationality or the 
thoroughness of the decision preparation, respectively, can vary. Among other 
things, cultural and institutional factors will impact the level of argumentation 
rationality in management decisions. Studying Germany and Korea, this paper 
identifies differences between the two countries with regard to certain aspects of 
national culture and corporate governance which can be related to decision 
preparation behavior. Based on this research, hypotheses on the argumentation 
rationality differences between German and Korean management decisions are 
developed and tested using data drawn from publicly available accounts. Altogether 
356 accounts were selected which report on three types of change actions in the 
German and Korean automotive industry and were published between 1990 and 
1997. Intra- and inter-country analyses were carried out for revealing typical 
patterns and country-specific differences of argumentation rationality. Inter alia, it 
turns out that differences between the decision preparation of German and Korean 
managers cannot be captured in a simple black-white manner. Rather results of 
comparing argumentation rationality in the two countries vary with the aspects of 
decision preparation considered and indicate the usefulness of a differentiated 





In the process of solving complex management problems, usually reasons or arguments, 
respectively, are put forward that support (and sometimes speak against) the recommended 
solution. A recent example is the intense debate about the merger between UK’s leading 
mobile communications company Vodafone AirTouch and the German Mannesmann 
corporation. 
At November 16th, 1999, Vodafone AirTouch published a press release presenting the 
strategic and economic advantages of a merger between Vodafone AirTouch and 
Mannesmann. Mannesmann’s management board, h owever, rejected the proposal because 
they were convinced to be more successful when staying independent. After that, Vodafone 
AirTouch decided to pursue this merger strategy even against the conviction of the 
Mannesmann management board and announced an intended offer to Mannesmann 
shareholders at November 19th, 1999. What followed was one of the most intensive and 
expensive corporate campaigns of both companies for gaining the support of the addressed 
shareholders for their opposing strategies. Both CEOs, Vodafone’s Chris Gent and 
Mannesmann’s Klaus Esser, were in the limelight and strove for the agreement of the 
institutional investors as well as the remaining owners of Mannesmann’s widely distributed 
stock with Vodafone’s or Mannesmann’s plans, respectiv ely. The two companies appeared 
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to try to reach this goal by using means of argumentation rather than rhetoric. E.g., in a 
Mannesmann press release of December 17th, 1999, the company’s communication strategy 
was termed “persuasion based on providing information.” 
At the end, Vodafone AirTouch’s campaign prevailed against the defense efforts by 
Mannesmann: Mannesmann’s management board members gave up their position on 
February 3rd, 2000, and recommended the merger after Vodafone AirTouch had improved 
its offer again. The following day, the supervisory board of Mannesmann approved this 
agreement, too. Figure 1 depicts a simplified summary of Chris Gent’s reasoning for the 
preferability of his merger strategy which he put forward in his letter to the Mannesmann 
shareholders enclosed in Vodafone’s official offer from December 23 rd, 1999. 
As this example should illustrate, the reason why managers back their decisions by 
arguments is that they want – or have to – convince their addressees (e.g., superior 
managers, the board of directors, investors and so on) of the soundness of that decision. In 
doing so, they inform about the decisive points of the measure in question which have been 
analyzed in the problem solving process. Thus, managerial argumentations mirror the 
thoroughness of the decision preparation. In short, they reveal the decisions’ argumentation 
rationality (v. Werder 1994; v. Werder 1999). 
Obviously, the argumentation rationality or the thoroughness of the decision preparation, 
respectively, can vary. Management decisions can be supported by more or less complex 
and convincing lines of reasoning. In other words, they can be more or less sound. These 
alternatives to prepare managerial measures more or less intensively raise two important 
questions. The first is the question about the impact of different levels of soundness or 
argumentation rationality, respectively, on the success of the corresponding management 
measure and thereby on the performance of the company. The second is the question about 
the factors that influence the argumentation rationality level. 
The first question concerns the fundamental problem of whether or not management 
does matter (see the discussion in v. Werder 1999, p. 673 f.). As has been argued in 
previous work, one can hypothesize that management has an optimal impact on a 
company’s performance if it chooses the right level of argumentation rationa lity for 
preparing decisions. Which rationality level is right, however, is contingent on the 
management situation (v. Werder 1999, p. 674). 
Directly testing this hypothesis seems still to be an unfruitful undertaking. Too few insights 
into the relationship between argumentation rationality and the performance of companies 
exist at this point of time. However, this lack of knowledge can be reduced by addressing 
the second question outlined above – the question about the factors that influence the 
argumentation rationality level. This paper contributes to this necessary research. It 
analyzes the impact of cultural and institutional factors on the level of argumentation 
rationality in management decisions. Employing methodology of account analysis 
introduced by Lewin for the research project on New Organization Forms in the 
Information Age (NOFIA) (Lewin 1996; Lewin and Hunter 1998, p. 274 ff.; Hunter 1999, p. 
96 ff.), management decisions in the German and Korean automotive industry reported in 
publicly available accounts are analyzed to find out typical patterns and country-specific 
differences of argumentation rationality. 
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Figure 1: Arguments in the Debate about the Merger between Vodafone AirTouch 
and Mannesmann (Based on Vodafone AirTouch CEO Chris Gent’s Letter to the 












































Change Action: Merger between Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann
Basic Claim: Mannesmann í s shareholders should accept the offer by Vodafone AirTouch Plc and
exchange their stocks of Mannesmann Aktiengesellschaft against common share of Vodafone
AirTouch Plc.
Global Layer of Detail-Reasoning
Reasoning 1 2 3 4
Because A1: The merger of the both companies promises a better development of the shareholder value and is in the
best interests of the shareholders.
Because A11: The merger creates worldwide presen ce and a global telecommunications leader.
Because A111: Both companies are ideal partners.
But A1111: The management of Mannesmann stressed the
existence of major strategic differences between the two
companies after the announcement of Vodafone í s intent
to merge.
But A11111: In fact, both companies share a
common vision with respect to the
opportunities of mobile voice, data,
and internet.
Because 
Because A112: Vodafone AirTouch has always followed a global strategy.
Because 
Because A113: To date, Mannesmann has focused only on investing in the European
market.
Because 
Because A12: Global presence creates advantages for the combined company.
Because A121: Global presence includes presence in the U.S. market ?the world í s
leading mobile phone market and the world í s most advanced internet
economy.
Because 
Because A13: Mobile phone and mobile multimedia services offer prospects for growth, which can better
be realized by the combined company than by Mannesmann alone.
Because A131: Analysts expect mobil e data and internet traffic to accelerate rapidly, as
soon as the technology allows.
Because A132: Information services, e-commerce and video over mobile will be the most
important growing sectors of the larger global providers in the near future.
Because A133: The return characteristics of investments in mobile services are more
favourable  than those for fixed network communications.
Because 
But A134: Providing fixed services is still necessary up to now.
Because 
Because 
Because A14: The offer by Vod afone AirTouch is generous and represents a significant premium to the
standalone value of Mannesmann í s businesses.
Because A141: Mannesmann í s shareholders receive a 68.8 per cent or 84.0 per cent,
respectively, premium to the closing price of a Mannesmann share on
October 20, 1999 (the day on which the terms of Mannesmann í s offer for
Orange were announced) or October 21, 1999 (the day following
Mannesmann í s offer for Orange), respectively.
Because 
But A142: The management board of Mannesmann has repeated  to reject the
modified offer by Vodafone AirTouch and placed increasing higher
valuations on Mannesmann.
But A1431: The management board of Mannesmann has not
justified its valuation in detail.
Because 
Because 
Because A15: Mannesmann values independen ce and control too much.
Because A151: The cost of Mannesmann í s independent strategy is considerable.
Because 
Because 
Because A16: The merger of the two companies can be realized peaceable with respect to social affairs.
Because A161: There will be no redundancies as a result of this transaction.
Because A162: A co-determined supervisory board will maintain.
Because A163: D?seldorf will remain the headquarters of Mannesmann.
Because 
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The study is based on the concept for investigating the argumentation rationality of 
managerial reasoning developed by v. Werder (1994; 1999). After a short sketch of this 
concept in section B (for more details see v. Werder 1999), the research hypotheses are 
elaborated (section C). In section D follows the description of the sample as well as the 




2.  MEASURING ARGUMENTATION RATIONALITY 
 
The soundness of a management decision or the thoroughness of its preparation, 
respectively, can be assessed by the convincing power of the arguments that are put forward 
by the advocate of the recommended change action to support the decision. The more 
thoroughly founded the arguments are, the higher the argumentation rationality (and thus 
the cognitive foundation) of the change action tends to be. In order to measure the 
argumentation rationality of complex managerial decisions more precisely, v. Werder 
(1994; 1999) has developed an ordinal scale of argumentation rationality, elaborating the 
argumentation theory of Stephen E. Toulmin (Toulmin 1958; Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik 
1979). This scale encompasses four main levels of argumentation rationality and contains a 
further differentiation of one of these main levels. The main levels are the unfounded, the 
global-founded, the detail-founded and the qualified-founded decision or change action 
(Figure 2). 
An unfounded change action has the lowest level of argumentation rationality since 
management does not support its recommended measure by any reason. In the case of 
global-founded change actions decisions are backed with propositions about the positive 
consequences of the proposed alternative for the realization of certain goals. Yet, there is no 
further backing for the global consequence propositions. It is not explained, why the 
recommended measure will realize the pursued goals. 
If global consequence propositions are not only stated but backed themselves, there are 
then detail-founded change actions. The argumentation rationality of detail-founded 
decisions varies according to the soundness of the detail-reasoning. Consequently, this 
main level of argumentation rationality can be further differentiated. According to a 
simplified scale, a detail-founding argumentation can be evaluated with regard to its depth, 
its breadth, and its pro/contra relation. 
The depth of an argumentation complex describes the number of argumentation layers 
over which the reasoning is developed. This attribute refers to the fact that arguments 
directly supporting a global consequence proposition can be questionable as well. In this 
case, these arguments must be backed with further reasons to increase the soundness of the 
argumentation. Doubts about the reliability or the relevance of arguments thus open another 
“round of reasoning,” leading to a second layer of the argumentation complex. Since the 
arguments of the second round of reasoning can be doubtful as well, these reasons 
themselves eventually have to be backed. Depending on their comprehensiveness, 
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An argumentation’s breadth depends on the number of arguments put forward to 
discuss a proposition on the higher layer. Since global consequence propositions can be 
backed by a variety of reasons, a complex argumentation can follow various argumentation 
lines and thereby be more or less narrow or broad, respectively. 
The pro/contra relation of an argumentation provides information about the proportion 
of reasons in support of (pro-arguments) and in objection to (contra-arguments) the 
proposition in question. This relation is especially important in the context of complex, 
unstructured management decisions. Such decisions by definition are always risky, so that 
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possible contra-arguments should be considered. With respect to its pro/contra relation, an 
argumentation can be more or less partial or impartial, respectively. Partial argumentations 
are biased toward the proposition and take only a few or even no contra-arguments into 
account. In contrast, impartial argumentations include a more balanced ratio of pros and 
cons. 
Within the main level of detail-foundation, an argumentation as a whole can thus be 
evaluated as to whether it is flat or deep, narrow or broad, and partial or impartial. These 
three items are each operationalized exploratively by a five-level semantic differential as 
defined in Figure 2. Combining the potential values of the three rationality variables results 
theoretically in 125 possible patterns of detail-founded reasoning. Obviously, not all of 
them make sense. In v. Werder (1999, p. 683 f.), therefore, four specific and meaningful 
types of detail-reasoning are introduced. The A-Form represents a partial and flat and 
narrow reasoning (e.g., 0i–0d–0b). This type of argumentation has of course the lowest 
degree of rationality within the main level of detail-foundation. The characteristic of the B-
Form of reasoning is that the argumentation is broader than deep, and usually less partial 
(e.g., 2i–0d–2b). Here, quite a lot of aspects of the management problem are taken into 
account but are not elaborated in great detail. The C-Form is typical for a controversial 
reasoning which comprehends a considerable number of contra-arguments, while being at 
the same time comparably flat and narrow (e.g., 3i–0d–0b). Finally, in case of the D-Form 
the reasoning is deeper than broad, and usually more partial (e.g., 0i–2d–0b). That means 
that only a few aspects are considered; these aspects, however, are investigated more 
thoroughly. 
The fourth main level of argumentation rationality, called qualified-founded change 
action, is achieved, if the state of the issue-related accessible knowledge has been 
completely exhausted while preparing the decision. In this case stop criteria for a 
meaningful limitation of the depth and the breadth of an argumentation are met (for details, 
see v. Werder 1999, p. 686). Since the reasoning takes all relevant aspects into account, 
demanding additional arguments epistemologically is not justified. Thus, the main level of 




3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
3.1. The Importance of the Environment as a Strategic Variable 
 
There are many debates on what causes firms to succeed. Building upon the four factors 
proposed as the essence of strategies by Andrews in 1971 – external conditions, internal 
capabilities, management philosophy, and social responsibilities – theorists of strategy have 
developed the following three perspectives1 (for more details, see the discussion in Cho and 
Lee 1998). 
The first perspective views the thoughts and the behavior of the subject who makes and 
executes the strategies of a company as the most decisive factor in the success of a firm 
                                                        
1 Of course, the three paradigms discussed are not exclusive. A number of other  
paradigms such as game theory, agency theory, institutional theory and so forth, has 
emerged in the strategy field since the 1980s. In this paper, however, we chose what we see 
as the major streams of research in strategy theory. 
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(Child 1972; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Westley and Mintzberg 1989; Nanus 1992). The 
role of top management is especially important in this line of argument. The chief executive 
can either indirectly affect the success of the firm by means of communication patterns 
(Barnard 1938), strategies, or organizational structures (Chandler 1962; Child 1972) or 
directly influence the success by offering visions of the future or by promoting the 
organizational commitment in the course of delivering them to its members (Westley and 
Mintzberg 1989; Nanus 1992). 
The second perspective emphasizes environmental factors surrounding a firm. These 
factors include the industry's structural characteristics(Porter 1980; Porter 1985), 
management conditions of the country (Porter 1990; Kogut 1993), density or the 
distribution of similar kinds of companies (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Hannan and Carroll 
1992), or the industrial policies of the gove0rnment (Johnson 1982; Okimoto 1989). 
According to this paradigm, the success of the firm depends more on external conditions 
than on its internal factors. 
Quite opposite to the second, the third perspective stresses the importance of internal 
resources for the success of a firm. According to this resource-based perspective, success 
depends more on its resources than on environmental factors (Wernerfelt 1984; Prahalad 
and Hamel 1990; Barney 1991; Conner 1991; Grant 1991; Mahoney and Pandian 1992; 
Peteraf 1993; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Firms in the same field react differently to 
environmental changes because each one differs in its resources. To be successful, the 
company should quickly grasp environmental changes and formulate appropriate strategies. 
More important, however, is the effective implementation of the formulated strategies. The 
company should either possess or create necessary resources in order to implement the 
strategies successfully (Barney 1986; Dierickx and Cool 1989). 
As discussed above, the existing paradigms of strategies explain the causes of business 
success from various perspectives: subjects (S), environment (E), or resources (R), 
respectively. Furthermore, these three paradigms properly reflect the economic and 
business circumstances in which they were argued and accepted. 
The first, subject-based, paradigm was immensely popular in the early part of the 
twentieth century, when the firms were relatively young, small, and simple in business 
portfolio. Management control of most companies was still in the hands of 
founders/entrepreneurs. The firms did not have many resources, either human or financial, 
and faced a comparably stable environment that was not much different from those their 
competitors faced. Therefore, top management was the most salient factor in determining 
the performance of firms. 
In the wake of the first Energy Crisis in 1973 and the second one in 1979, the concern of 
the top management in major firms suddenly shifted to analyzing the industries they had 
been in to see if they would be as attractive as before. Particularly hit were oil-oriented 
industries such as petroleum refining and petrochemical, and oil-dependent industries such 
as automobile and shipbuilding. In the midst of these turmoils, top management scrambled 
to secure effective means to understand industry dynamics. The second, environment-based, 
perspective that would evaluate potentials of various industries was a natural fit during this 
period. 
The environment-based perspective, however, deviated the attention of top management 
away from securing and utilizing their resources. Instead, they would argue the importance 
of protecting the domestic environment with the aid of the government, resulting, for 
example, in raising trade barriers against importation of automobiles and semiconductors 
between the United States and Japan. Such an externally oriented attitude brought more 
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harms than benefit to the competitiveness of the U.S. economy and companies. Contrary to 
the expectations of major firms such as GM and IBM with certain degrees of influence over 
the government that they would survive and prosper through government protection in the 
form of trade barriers, their competitiveness gradually eroded in the long run vis-a-vis 
foreign firms that were living under cut-throat competition. It was in this context that a 
number of scholars started to argue the importance of internally developed resources such 
as core competence, capability, and tacit knowledge. 
The above review of the strategy paradigms in the past several decades shows that 
scholars had identified only one of the three variables, subject, environment, and resources, 
as the most salient variable in strategy decisions at a certain point in time. However, we all 
know that the real world is composed of all of the three variables, regardless of which 
perspectives strategy scholars would argue. The subject should be able to scan the external 
environment carefully and identify more important attributes that might affect the outcome 
of the chosen strategy, and utilize and explore the internal resources that they can mobilize 
and create. In this context, all three variables should be given fair opportunities to be 
learned by strategic managers, albeit their relative importance might vary by specific 
situations. We, therefore, propose a paradigm – the “ser-M” view – which focuses on the 
interactions between subject (s), environment (e), and resources (r) and integrates them into 
a dynamic mechanism (M) (for more details see Cho and Lee 1998). 
Furthermore, we are able to group these three variables under two broad categories, 
firm-specific and industry-specific. The subject and resources vary by the firm, while the 
environment is typically industry-specific, that is, the environment is the same or similar 
among the firms that compete with another in the same industry. Therefore, we may need to 
choose the environment as the most important independent variable when we construct a 
generalized model of strategy development. Especially in the case of cross-country analysis, 
we have to emphasize environmental variables for explaining similarities or differences 
between management practices in the studied countries. Since we reduce our analysis to the 
automotive industry, we may assume that different management practices within one 
country are mainly dependent on varying subjects and resources. Causes of cross-country 
differences, however, will be environmental in nature. 
Focusing on environmental factors we argue that culture and corporate governance are 
conspicuous contingencies for explaining differing decision preparation behavior. Two 
streams of research that are dedicated to building theories about cross-country differences 
of management practices guide this choice. One stresses cultural impacts on management, 
the second views managerial behavior as being shaped by social, political, or economic 
institutions which might vary by countries. According to Hofstede, up to 50 percent of 
cross-country differences in work-related values that also affect management practices can 
be explained with regard to cultural differences (cf. Hofstede 1983, p. 78; Hofstede et al. 
1990, p. 288). Governance structures, inter alia, reflect the institution of specific nation 
state forms of capitalism the importance of which for understanding managerial practices 
have been emphasized by scholars like Child (1981, p. 320 ff.); Whitley (1994, p. 157 ff.); 
Calori et al. (1997, p. 682 ff.); Lewin, Long, and Carroll (1999, p. 541 f.). We, therefore, 
will describe the two constructs of culture and corporate governance and reveal their 
systematic relation to argumentation rationality. Furthermore, we will identify differences 
between Germany and Korea with regard to specific aspects of culture and corporate 
governance and explore hypotheses about the effects of these variables on argumentation 
rationality (Figure 3). 
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4. CULTURE AS A STRATEGIC VARIABLE 
 
The importance of culture for argumentation behavior cannot be doubted seriously in 
this context though its general impact on management is sometimes overestimated (Nasif et 
al. 1991, p. 82; Sullivan 1997, p. 387). It is worth noting that we do not think about culture 
as the only cause of cross-country differences. Culture is a major but not the only aspect of 
national distinctiveness (Child 1981, p. 328; Kelley, Whatley, and Worthley 1987, p. 19; 
Cheng 1989, p. 5; Hickson and Pugh 1995, p. 15 ff.; Sullivan 1997, p. 390). As already 
mentioned, we take other variables into account, namely corporate governance, that are 
distinct from culture, as will be shown below. Furthermore, we are aware that culture and 
country (or nation, respectively) are not necessarily equal (Child 1981, p. 307; Bhagat and 
McQuaid 1982, p. 654 f.; Sekaran 1983, p. 67; Kelley, Whatley, and Worthley 1987, p. 19; 
Ricks, Toyne, and Martinez 1990, p. 224; Nasif et al. 1991, p. 82; Tayeb 1994, p. 431 f.; 
Georgas and Berry 1995, p. 121; Triandis 1995, p. 3 f.; Boyacigiller and Adler 1997, p. 
400). Nevertheless, we assume spatial congruence of culture and nation because possible 
ethnic and regional cultural differences within Germany or Korea can legitimately be 
neglected in our case. We stress the differences between the two countries on the nation 
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level that will prevail even when averaging cultures across societal groups (Hofstede 1983, 
p. 77 f.; Hickson and Pugh 1995, p. 25; Harzing and Hofstede 1996, p. 308; Lubatkin et al. 
1998, p. 672)2. 
For elaborating cultural influences and deriving sound hypotheses about its impact on 
managerial argumentation rationality, the construct of culture has to be contemplated more 
carefully. There is no widely accepted and shared definition of culture (Kroeber and 
Parsons 1958, p. 582; White 1959, p. 227; Bhagat and McQuaid 1982, p. 653; Adler 1984, 
p. 49; Roberts and Boyacigiller 1984, p. 428; Schneider 1988, p. 232; Bhagat et al. 1990, p. 
60; Redding 1994, p. 331; Georgas and Berry 1995, p. 125 f.; Boyacigiller and Adler 1997, 
p. 402). Instead, culture is an ill-defined and elusive phenomenon. One of the difficulties 
when explicating the term culture is its use in different sciences. Culture is studied not only 
in anthropology and ethnology but also by biologists, psychologists, sociologists, as well as 
by political, economic, and business scientists (Schneider 1988, p. 232; Boyacigiller and 
Adler 1997, p. 402). More importantly, culture definitions rely on specific paradigms 
whose fundamental assumptions may sometimes diverge or that might even be 
incommensurable (Smircich 1983, p. 339; Boyacigiller and Adler 1997, p. 402 ff.). Because 
of the limited scope of this paper, we will not enter this paradigm discussion that 
meanwhile has also reached the field of international business research (Steinmann and 
Scherer 1997, p. 78 ff.; Toyne and Nigh 1997, p. 3 ff.). Instead, we want to identify 
definitions and dimensions of culture that seem to be appropriate for our research purpose. 
Kluckhohn (1951); White (1959, p. 227 ff.); Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961, p. 4 ff.); 
Hofstede (1980, p. 25 ff., 42 ff.); Child (1981, p. 323 ff.); Bhagat et al. (1990, p. 60 ff.); 
Triandis (1994, p. 110 ff.); Boyacigiller and Adler (1997, p. 400 ff.) and others have made 
intriguing (and partly critical) literature reviews of the culture concept. In contrast to the 
broader definitions by some ethnologists who view culture as a historically stable and 
integrated complex whole that also includes economy, social organization, politics, law, 
education, religion, collective knowledge – in short: all aspects of life of a specific group of 
humans besides their biological nature (Herskovits 1955, p. 305; Kroeber and Parsons 1958, 
p. 582; Wimmer 1996, p. 402; Schweizer 1999, p. 4), for the purpose of management 
studies it is useful to interpret culture more narrowly. Reviewing more than 100 current 
definitions of culture, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952, p. 181) conclude the following as the 
approximate consensus of these definitions: “Culture consists of patterns, explicit and 
implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the 
distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the 
essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas 
and especially their attached values.” More briefly, Kluckhohn and Kelly (1945, p. 98, 
italics deleted) define culture as “a historically derived system of explicit and implicit 
designs for living, which tends to be shared by all or specially designated members of a 
group.” 
While different cultural dimensions have been proposed (e.g., Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck 1961, p. 10 f.; Bhagat et al. 1990, p. 62; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 
1993, p. 10 f.), for our purpose it seems to be most appropriate to use the framework 
introduced by Hofstede (1980). Hofstede (1991, p. 5), defines culture as “the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of 
people from another” (italics deleted). This “software of the mind” incl udes patterns of 
                                                        
2 Additionally, the often stated cultural homogeneity in Korea and other East Asian  
countries could be noted (e.g., Whitley 1990, p. 49). 
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thinking, feeling, and potential acting which the group members learned throughout their 
lifetime. Hofstede (1980, p. 54 ff., 92 ff.) originally identified four dimensions of culture 
that will be explicated in detail below: power distance, individualism, masculinity, and 
uncertainty avoidance3. These major dimensions reflect the assumed common problems that 
all human societies share. According to Inkeles and Levinson (1969, p. 447 ff.), the basic 
issues every society has to deal with are (1) the relation to authority, (2) the conception of 
self, in particular (2a) the relationship between individual and society, and (2b) the 
individual’s concept of masculinity and femininity, as well as (3) the ways of dealing with 
conflicts, including the control of aggression and the expression of feelings (see Hofstede 
1980, p. 47; Hofstede 1991, p. 13). Hofstede and many other scholars have used these 
dimensions extensively. Their values, thus, are proved to be relevant for managerial 
behavior both theoretically and empirically (cf. Triandis and Albert 1987, p. 275 ff.; 
Jackofsky, Slocum and Jackofsky, p. 73 ff.; Slocum, and McQuaid 1988, p. 44 ff.; Kogut 
and Singh 1988, p. 427; Schneider 1989, p. 153 ff.; Shackleton and Ali 1990, p. 110; Erez 
1994, p. 574; Shane 1994, p. 629 f.; Søndergaard 1994, p. 449 ff.; Triandis 1994, p. 128 ff.; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, p. 48 ff.; Geletkanycz 1997, p. 618, 624; Floyd et al. 1998, 
p. 284 ff.). 
Since Hofstede’s huge data basis also includes survey results from Ge rmany and Korea, 
the values of the culture dimensions have already been determined and we already know 
the cultural differences between Germany and Korea with respect to the dimensions in 
Hofstede’s concept. Methodologically, we approve that Hofstede surve yed cultural values 
at the country level with reasonable validity and reliability (Kogut and Singh 1988, p. 422; 
Shane 1994, p. 631; Søndergaard 1994, p. 449; Shane 1995, p. 52; Geletkanycz 1997, p. 
623). 
Nevertheless, we don’t ignore or suppress the criti cs of Hofstede’s concept. 
Interestingly, as Chapman (1997, p. 18, 20) remarks, most of the critics have been initiated 
by Hofstede himself (for summaries of the criticism, see Roberts and Boyacigiller 1984, p. 
446 ff.; Smith and Bond 1993, p. 41 ff.; Schwartz 1994, p. 87 ff.; Søndergaard 1994, p. 
449; Harzing and Hofstede 1996, p. 307 ff.; Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars 1996, p. 234; 
Hofstede 1998a, p. 481). Hofstede’s four dimensions are the result of factor analyses based 
on 116,000 questionnaires from IBM employees in about 40 countries (for explanations 
about reported inconsistencies concerning the time frame of the survey, the number of 
employees and countries as well as the design of the used questionnaire, see Hofstede 1983, 
p. 77 f.; Schmid 1996, p. 256). With regard to the data bank, it is criticized that the IBM 
data are too old and that they do not provide information about the entire national culture. 
Indeed, the data were collected between 1967 and 1973. However, replicating and follow-
up research was carried out, too (Shackleton and Ali 1990, p. 112 ff.; Søndergaard 1994, p. 
450 ff.). Furthermore, matched samples like Hofstede’s IBM data, which survey 
respondents from different countries who are functionally equivalent in all respects except 
their national culture, are appropriate for revealing cultural differences (Hofstede et al. 
1990, p. 288; Hofstede 1991, p. 13; Schwartz 1994, p. 90; Harzing and Hofstede 1996, p. 
308; Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars 1996, p. 234). Additionally, for weighing the 
                                                        
3 Later a fifth dimension – long-term versus short-term orientation – was added (for  
details, see The Chinese Culture Connection 1987, p. 145 ff.; Hofstede and Bond 1988, p. 
14 ff.; Hofstede 1991, p. 159 ff.). We will exclude this extension because the conclusions 
from this dimension with respect to our concept of argumentation rationality seem to be 
less straightforward than from the previous ones. 
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relevance of this criticism, one has to acknowledge the historical stability of national 
cultures as well as the probability of similar developments in different cultures initiated by 
the same forces of change. 
Further criticisms concern the number and the distinction of the dimensions as well as 
the empirical scores of some countries. As indicated above, different dimensions of culture 
have been defined and discussed. Some authors extend Hofstede’s classification more or 
less arbitrarily by adding (partly overlapping) dimensions of other concepts that promise 
additional insights (e.g., Bhagat et al. 1990, p. 62). We will demonstrate that Hofstede’s 
dimensions can work as an appropriate framework for our study and that they offer 
interesting possibilities for deriving propositions about argumentation rationality 
differences between Germany and Korea. As far as we know and as we can say from our 
personal experience with German and Korean culture, the country scores of these two 
countries do not seem to contradict intuition as it is the case for some other country results, 
for example, Spain or France (Chapman 1997, p. 20, 22 f.; d’Iribarne 1997, p. 34 ff.).  
Most fundamentally, proponents of an idiographic framework of culture reject the 
survey method as an unsuitable way to discover cultural differences. This quarrel obviously 
also reflects the tension between interpretive and positivist models in social sciences and 
for culture research (Burrell and Morgan 1979; Chapman 1997). We agree with Hofstede 
(1980, p. 40 ff.) that neither an etic nor an emic way for studying culture is enough4 but that 
multi-paradigmatic studies are required. In this sense, our contribution has to be viewed as 
a first tentative step that has to be followed by additional, methodologically varying ones. 
To summarize, there seem to be no alternative approaches today which offer a 
comparable theoretical and empirical elaboration and which are as suitable for applications 
in our management context as Hofstede’s classification apparently is. Wh ile some 
frameworks have even more severe methodological weaknesses, others lack any empirical 
foundation. 
The four bipolar dimensions of culture identified by Hofstede are power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Table 1 illustrates the empirically 







                                                        
4 While an etic approach strives for relatively culture-free description of cultural  
phenomena using universal terms and variables that can be generalized across cultures, 
emic approaches assume the uniqueness of different cultures Thus, from an emic 
perspective, cultural phenomena can only be understood from within the culture using its 
particular language and concepts specific to that culture (for details, see Triandis et al. 1972, 
p. 39 ff.; Bhagat and McQuaid 1982, p. 655 f.; Ekstrand and Ekstrand 1986; Segall 1986, p. 
527 f.; Headland, Pike, and Harris 1990; Smith and Bond 1993, p. 47 ff.; Pike and 
McKinney 1996; Schmid 1996, p. 288 ff.; Chapman 1997, p. 17 f.). Without doubt, some 
cultural developments need a more emic approach to be discovered, but a purely emic 
approach obviously makes cross-cultural considerations impossible. As Berry (1990, p. 93) 
puts it: “We cannot be »cultural« without some notion like emic; and we cannot be »cross« 
without some notion like etic.” 
ARGUMENTATION RATIONALITY IN THE  
GERMAN AND KOREAN AUTOMOTIVE  INDUSTRY 
 
27
Table 1: Cultural Index Values for Germany and Korea 
 
 German score Korean score 
Power distance index 35 60 
Individualism index 67 18 
Masculinity index 66 39 
Uncertainty avoidance index 65 85 
Source: Hofstede 1991, p. 26, 53, 84, 113. 
 
Power distance reflects the degree of (in)equality within a society and its institutions. 
Large power distance characterizes countries in which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations accept significant differences in the distribution of power and 
consider them as normal, whereas cultures at the opposite side of this dimension are more 
egalitarian in nature (Hofstede 1991, p. 28). 
From a managerial point of view, large power distance converges with high 
centralization, high positional authority of top management, and few attempts to 
democratize and empower the work place. Thus, we expect that large power distance is 
related with lower levels of argumentation rationality because accounting for top 
management decisions is not necessary for implementing them. Employees do not expect 
explanations of superior decisions and are not used to participative decision styles. Top 
management does not need the power of reason because it can use its positional power for 
carrying its decisions through. Since the power distance index (PDI) of Germany is lower 
(PDI=35) than the Korean one (PDI=60) (see Hofstede 1991, p. 26), we assume German 
managers to prepare their decisions more thoroughly than Korean managers do. 
The second dimension – individualism versus collectivism – deals with the relation 
between the individual and the collective in society. Individualist societies value the 
individual higher than the group. Ties between societal members are loose and everyone is 
expected to look after his or her own good first. Contrary, in collectivist cultures the people 
are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups which protect their members in exchange for 
unquestioning, permanent loyalty (Hofstede 1991, p. 51). 
Obviously, collectivism converges with searching and striving for group harmony (e.g., 
Xie, Song, and Stringfellow 1998, p. S198). “Everybody is supposed … to have no other 
opinions and beliefs than the opinions and beliefs in their ingroup” (Hofstede 1983, p. 79). 
Decision preparation takes place within the rules of the group and is not allowed to 
challenge basic premises that hold the collective together. As we know from social 
psychology, decision making in cohesive groups is dedicated to preserving group harmony. 
This groupthink syndrome is described as concurrence-seeking and inclines members to 
avoid any discordant arguments or schisms (Janis 1982, p. 479; Steiner 1982, p. 503; Janis 
1983, p. 9, 174 ff.; Janis 1989, p. 56; Peterson et al. 1998, p. 273). Even without being fully 
aware of it in all cases, they might uncritically approach a decision rule which Janis (1989, 
p. 56 f.) terms the “Preserve Group Harmony” rule 5 . Thus, we expect management 
decisions in cultures with a high degree of collectivism to be less argumentation rational, 
especially less impartial. While the German individualism index (IDV) is 67, the Korean 
                                                        
5 We are aware that groupthink does not necessarily imply lower quality of decision  
making processes in general. However, we do not examine routine or minor decisions, but 
major strategic ones. In these cases the detrimental effects for critical deliberations of the 
issues in question will predominate (cf. Janis 1989, p. 63, 247). 
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score is slightly low (IDV=18)6 (Hofstede 1991, p. 53). Against this background, German 
management decisions will be more argumentation rational, in particular more impartial. 
Masculinity versus femininity reflects the distinctiveness as well as the content of 
gender roles. Masculine cultures sharply divide the roles between the sexes in society. 
Furthermore, men have to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success. They search 
for earnings, prestige, advancement, and challenge. Contrary, women are expected to be 
more modest, tender, and concerned with the nonmaterial quality of life. They value good 
working relations with their superiors and peers, an environment characterized by 
friendliness and desirability, as well as employment security. Femininity pertains to 
societies which define overlapping social gender roles and which respect masculine and 
feminine values equally (Hofstede 1991, p. 79 ff.). 
Again, feminine societies tend to foster harmonious decision processes that avoid 
challenging basic premises and positions. Discussions within ‘feminine’ top management 
teams do not abstract from the involved persons and seek for equality and consensus. In 
contrast, masculine top management teams’ preference for achievement leads to problem 
solutions which refer to features of the discussed issue only. Managerial discussants are 
sounding and doubting positions regardless of other’s interests or feelings. Therefore, we 
assume those managers to prepare their decisions more thoroughly than managers in a 
feminine cultural setting. Expecting higher levels of argumentation rationality in masculine 
cultures is supported by Hofstede’s assumption that managers in feminine societies more 
often use intuition when making decisions (Hofstede 1991, p. 96). Germany’s masculinity 
index (MAS) is high (MAS=66), while Korea (MAS=39) is a feminine country (Hofstede 
1991, p. 84). Thus, we expect German managers to practice higher levels of argumentation 
rationality when preparing managerial decisions, again particularly with respect to the 
determinant of impartiality. 
The dimension of uncertainty avoidance measures the tolerance for ambiguity in 
societies. High scores of the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) characterize countries the 
members of which feel uncomfortable in uncertain or unknown situations. Coping with 
uncertain situations causes stress and makes individuals feel nervous in this cultural 
environment. In contrast, people in weak uncertainty avoidance cultures accept uncertainty 
and don’t become upset by it (Hofstede 1991, p. 113).  
At first glance, strong uncertainty avoidance could converge with high levels of 
argumentation rationality because managers might try to reduce uncertainty by processing 
more information and reflecting the problem in question more thoroughly. However, more 
weighty is the need for rules and operating procedures in those cultures. Problem solutions, 
thus, have to be found within the space left by more or less restrictive regulations that have 
to be obeyed when creating a solution and that are obeyed voluntarily in order to reduce 
one’s own perceived degree of uncertainty. Additionally, managers avoid hinting on aspects 
that make possible solutions appear less appropriate and that create uncertainty or 
ambiguity within the top management team. Again, striving for group harmony and 
consensus as well as avoiding contra-arguments are important patterns of behavior in 
cultures with high degrees of uncertainty avoidance because people feel threatened by 
diverging opinions and beliefs and seek for protecting conformity. Oppositely, members of 
weak uncertainty avoidance cultures are more tolerant for ambiguity – for different ideas, 
                                                        
6 Concerning possible changes of this characterization, the results of a study by Cha  
(1994, p. 170) shall be noted: Focussing on a more emic perspective he concludes that 
despite changes toward individualism Korea remains to be a collectivist country. 
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approaches, and concepts (Geletkanycz 1997, p. 620). In our context, this tolerance gains 
specific importance, because the problems top management faces include per definitionem 
complex issues that (to some degree) always refer to the uncertain, unknown, unstructured, 
and unpredictable. Since the German uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) is lower (UAI=65) 
than the Korean one (UAI=85) (Hofstede 1991, p. 113), we expect to observe higher levels 
of argumentation rationality in the German management accounts. 
Summarizing the developed relations between culture (as independent variable) and the 
extent of decision preparation (as dependent variable) we posit the following hypotheses:  
H1: Since power distance is smaller in Germany than in Korea, we expect German 
management accounts to be more argumentation rational than the Korean ones. 
H2: Since Germany is more individualist than Korea, we expect German management 
accounts to be more argumentation rational than the Korean ones, in particular more 
impartial. 
H3: Since Germany is more masculine than Korea, we expect German management 
accounts to be more argumentation rational than the Korean ones, in particular more 
impartial. 
H4: Since uncertainty avoidance is weaker in Germany than in Korea, we expect 
German management accounts to be more argumentation rational than the Korean ones, in 
particular more impartial. 
 
 
5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS A STRATEGIC VARIABLE 
 
As introduced above, the second independent variable we focus on is corporate 
governance. Since corporate governance can generally be described as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury Committee 1992, para. 2.5; Stapledon 
1996, p. 3; Hampel Report 1998, para. 1.15; v. Werder and Grundei 2000), it refers to the 
set of relationships between corporate management, board of directors, shareholders, and 
other stakeholders (cf. Monks and Minow 1995, p. 1; Lorsch 1996, p. 200; Business 
Roundtable 1997, p. 2 f.; OECD 1999, p. 2). 
Corporate governance integrates two distinct issues – organization of top management 
as well as the relation between management and stakeholders. We will stress the second 
issue. The immense public attention to corporate governance topics results from the societal 
demand for corporate accountability and the emergence of global markets, in particular 
capital markets. Without doubt and for several reasons corporate relations to shareholders 
(in terms of accountability) gain specific importance in this context (Monks and Minow 
1995, p. 43; Business Roundtable 1997, p. 3). The debate on corporate governance is 
chiefly concerned with examining the relationship between management and investors, 
especially institutional investors whose power increases because of their dramatic growth in 
the globalizing capital markets (Farrar and Girton 1981, p. 370 ff.; Shleifer and Vishny 
1986, p. 462; Jensen and Warner 1988, p. 5 f.; Heard 1990, p. 245, 248 f.; Chaganti and 
Damanpour 1991, p. 479; Coffey and Fryxell 1991, p. 437; Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993, p. 
19; Hopt 1994, p. VII; Roe 1994, p. 71; Blair 1995, p. 45 f.; Stapledon 1996, p. 19 ff.; 
Brancato 1997, p. 19 ff.; Davies 1997, p. 51; Gerke 1998, p. 613 f.). 
We will take up this focus by contemplating the ownership structure of German or 
Korean companies, respectively. We are concerned with the top management’s abilities to 
exercise control and with the shareholders’ possibilities to influence corporate policy. The 
second independent variable, corporate governance, thus, means in the present study 
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foremost the distribution of power between the corporation’s management and its 
shareholders and the structure of ownership (see also Buxbaum 1991, p. 3 ff.; Blair 1995, p. 
4 ff.; Monks and Minow 1995, p. 23, 84 ff.; Stapledon 1996, p. 3, 5 ff.; Thomsen and 
Pedersen 1996, p. 150; Davies 1997, p. 54 ff.). 
Doubtless, corporate accountability requires considering corporate relations to society 
and balancing other relevant interests in the company’s business, too (Freeman and Reed 
1983, p. 89 ff.; Freeman 1984, p. 195 ff.; Blair 1995, p. 202 ff.; Monks and Minow 1995, p. 
38 ff.; Hampel Report 1998, para. 1.3, 1.16 ff.). Additionally, we are aware, as briefly 
mentioned above, that corporate governance includes many more facets that could be 
relevant for our study. For example, cross-country differences regarding the composition of 
top management teams and of boards, rewarding systems, specific legal norms with impact 
on governance structures (e.g., the co-determination law or the requirement of a two-tier 
structure in Germany), etc. might cause differences in argumentation rationality between 
the two countries. Yet, one has to acknowledge the importance of ownership structure and 
the distribution of power in order to understand management composition, board structure, 
and the design of incentive plans comprehensively. Nevertheless, we again emphasize that 
our research is a first step for indicating significant differences between German and 
Korean management’s decision preparation behavior. As a consequence, we decided to 
contemplate a very salient aspect of corporate governance differences and to leave the 
examination of other factors for further research studies. 
With regard to the distribution of power and the structure of ownership, we differentiate 
between public and private companies. Public companies are owned by many shareholders 
and controlled by the capital market. Private companies, in contrast, are influenced by just 
a few (private) shareholders (for instance the founder and/or his family) 7 . While in 
Germany the governance structures correspond with the type of a public company, Korea is 
characterized by the governance structure called private company here. Prominent 
examples are the big Korean conglomerates called chaebols the ownership of which is 
strongly connected with corporate control (Yoo and Lee 1987, p. 97 f.; Hamilton, Zeile, and 
Kim 1990, p. 120; Whitley 1990, p. 57; Whitley 1991, p. 2 f.; Whitley 1994, p. 158, 160; 
Cho, Kim, and Rhee 1998, p. 499). 
Here, again, we have to emphasize our specific comparative perspective: German 
companies are more public than the Korean ones8. Compared with several other countries, 
however, their companies have to be viewed as even more public than the German ones9. 
For instance, the ownership concentration is much higher in Germany than in Great Britain, 
the U.S., or Japan (Prowse 1994, p. 33 ff.; Roe 1994, p. 28 f.; Windolf and Beyer 1995, p. 7 
ff.; Davies 1997, p. 48; Franks 1997, p. 283 f.; Kaplan 1997, p. 252; Dietl 1998, p. 124; 
Mülbert 1998, p. 448 ff., 455, 494 ff.; Prigge 1998, p. 972 f.; Roe 1998, p. 371 f.; 
Wymeersch 1998a, p. 311; Wymeersch 1998b, p. 1168 f.). 
Furthermore, the concentration of ownership and control in Korean companies is 
sometimes hidden in official figures (see Table 2). In the Korean business sector, a typical 
                                                        
7 Our terminology is a very common one. However, for avoiding misunderstandings,  
one has to note that it differs fundamentally, of course, from those definitions of public 
ownership which refer to corporate control by national or local government agencies (e.g., 
Ogden and Watson 1999, p. 526). 
8 Although, ownership starts to disperse in Korea, too (Cho, Kim, and Rhee 1998, p.  
504). 
9 Therefore, Roe (1998, p. 361) terms them “semi-private” companies. 
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pattern of chaebol behavior, at least until the 1997 economic crisis, was cross-shareholdings 
among the member firms within the same chaebol group. Thus, the founders and founding 
families were able to maintain their control over the chaebol member firms even with less 
than 50 % shares, sometimes with less than 8 %. This 8 % guideline has been set by the 
government, which would allow certain benefits such as liberal bank loans to the firms that 
meet this guideline. Since the government utilized chaebols as a vehicle for implementing 
various industrial policies such as a move into new strategic industries, the government 
exercised a double-edged policy toward chaebols, sticks and carrots. While the government 
favored chaebol firms with highly dispersed share-ownership (to less than 8 %), it had to 
guarantee to the founders and their families that no hostile takeovers would be allowed. In 
order to dwarf any hostile takeover bids, the government practiced various discretionary 
measures, that restricted minority shareholders' rights, such as the rights to choose outside 
directors and to review proceedings of the board of directors. 
 
Table 2: Ownership Concentration of Listed Companies in Germany and Korea 
 
Percentage of voting rights con-
trolled by the largest shareholder 
Germany (1994)a Korea (1999)b 
0 % – 9.99 % 3.2 % 8.7 % 
10 % – 24.99 % 6.9 % 25.8 % 
25 % – 49.99 % 16.7 % 49.3 % 
50 % – 74.99 % 31.9 % 13.7 % 
75 % – 100 % 41.3 % 2.5 % 
a  Data based on Germany’s 550 largest listed AGs and KGaAs (source: Dietl 1998, p. 124).  
b  Data based on Korea’s 759 listed in KSE in 1999 (source: Korea Stock Exchang e 2000). 
 
In our study we collected data about the management measures at eight auto companies. 
The ownership structure of these surveyed companies is shown in Table 3. In Germany, the 
portion of widely dispersed stock varies – with Volkswagen being the most public company 
regarding this aspect10. However, even the corporations with high percentages of private 
ownership are traded at stock exchanges with considerable turnovers, too. All studied 
German companies are, therefore, pressurized by the (international) capital markets and 
urged to show satisfying market performances. For example, despite the significant share 
ownership by the private family Quandt in the case of BMW (see Table 3), the Bavarian 











                                                        
10 Volkswagen’s widely distributed stock is held by ca. 728,000 shareholders  
(Commerzbank 1997, p. 1072). 
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a For Germany: Intercompany linkages between the Monopolies Commission’s German    
      Top 100 (the hundred largest German companies in all industrial branches on the basis  
      of the criterion of value added). 
b Ownership exists at least indirectly. 
c Common shares owned by the Volkswagen AG itself. 
d After 1990 Porsche was not listed among the Monopolies Commission’s German Top  
      100. Therefore, the commission did not examine its ownership structure again.  
       However, no changes in the distribution of Porsche’s common shares were observed  
       (e.g., Commerzbank 1997, p. 794). 
e Daewoo Motor is not listed in the Seoul Stock Exchange, thus no data is available for  
      the distribution of shares. 
Sources: 
For German companies, 1990: Monopolkommission 1994, p. 210, 214 
For German companies, 1996: Monopolkommission 1998, p. 196. 
For Korean companies, 1990: Annual Report of Listed Companies–Korea Listed 
Companies Association 1991, p. 1,554, 1,581, 1,593. 
For Korean companies, 1996: Annual Report of Listed Companies–Korea Listed 
Companies Association 1997, p. 1,659, 1,701, 1,734. 
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Concerning market pressure, from an international point of view, the German stock market 
is sometimes stated to be underdeveloped or even to play a negligible role in corporate 
governance (Schmalenbach 1990, p. 109; Kübler 1994, p. 574; Hansen 1995, p. 323; Kim 
1995, p. 379; Wymeersch 1995, p. 311; Deutsche Bundesbank 1997, p. 28; Dietl 1998, p. 
120 ff.; Prigge 1998, p. 986; Wymeersch 1998a, p. 311; Wymeersch 1998b, p. 1185; Lewin, 
Long, and Carroll 1999, p. 542). There were only 741 domestic companies out of 5,468 
stock corporations quoted at all German stock exchanges at the end of 1998 (Deutsche 
Börse AG 1999, p. 23; Hansen 1999a, p. R 67, respectively). The going public of the 
German Telekom let the market capitalization of domestic companies exceed the 1,000 
billion DM line in November 1996 for the first time (U.S.: 13,354; Japan: 4,881; Great 
Britain: 2,544 billion DM) (Deutsche Bundesbank 1997, p. 28)11. Although, doubtless, the 
capital markets are (still) much more influential in the Anglo-American regions, their 
power and the importance of institutional investors are growing in Germany, too (Schneider 
1990, p. 318 ff.; Assmann 1992, p. 132; Baums and Fraune 1995, p. 97; Hansen 1996, p. R 
88, R 90; Hansen 1997, p. R 416, R 418; Hansen 1998, p. R 467 f.; Mülbert 1998, p. 449; 
Prigge 1998, p. 968; Wymeersch 1998b, p. 1187). For instance, insurance companies (and 
investment funds) increased their stock assets from 114.9 (44.5) billion DM in 1990 to 
209.4 (127.0) billion DM in 1995 (Deutsche Bundesbank 1997, p. 38)12. 
Additionally, with respect to our sample, one has to acknowledge that the German stock 
exchanges are top-heavy (Schmalenbach 1990, p. 109; Hansen 1995, p. R 322; Hansen 
1996, p. R 88; Prigge 1998, p. 986; Hansen 1999b, p. 38). I.e., they do not have the breadth 
and the depth of the Anglo-American ones concerning volume and turnover. However, the 
companies we will survey have a significant weight within the market. They are large 
corporations which constantly make a major part of public stock trading turnover at the 
German stock exchanges (see Table 4). 
                                                        
11  Based on the exchange rates at the end of December 1996, the corresponding 
numbers are U.S.: 8,663; Japan: 3,166; Great Britain: 1,650, and Germany: 650 billion US-
$. More revealing than absolute figures is relating the state of the capital market to the size 
of the domestic economy. Market capitalization of domestic companies as a percentage of 
nominal GDP amounted to 27 percent in Germany compared to 122 percent in the U.S., 63 
percent in Japan, and 152 percent in Great Britain (Deutsche Bundesbank 1997, p. 28). 
12 I.e., based on the exchange rates at the end of December 1990 or 1995, respectively, 
the stock assets of insurance companies increased from 77.0 to 145.8, and the ones of 
investment funds from 29.8 to 88.4 billion US-$. 
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Table 4: Stock Exchange Turnover and Market Capitalization of the Four  


























(= 81.145 billion US-$)b 
12.10 
163.064 






(= 40.408 billion US-$) 
39.27 
51.185 




(= 14.887 billion US-$) 
80.92 
32.352 




(= 1.582 billion US-$) 
94.79 
3.325 










(= 945.586 billion US-$) 
100.0
0 
a Source: Hansen 1999b, p. R 36. 
b The corresponding figures in US-$ are based on the exchange rates at the end of  
   December 1998. 
c Based on the German DAX and MDAX which represent the 100 most actively traded   
  German stocks. 
 
In contrast, the importance of capital markets is much lower in the case of the four 
Korean auto companies. Daewoo Motor Company is not even publicly listed in the stock 
exchange. Stock exchange turnover and market capitalization of the remaining three 
companies at the Korean stock market are much lower compared to the German figures. In 
1998, the stock exchange turnover of Hyundai, Ssangyong and Kia was 1,320.196, 331.061, 
and 255.071 billion Won (= 1.097, 0.275, and 0.212 billion US-$), respectively. At 
December 28th, 1998, the market capitalization of these three companies was 1,287.261, 
177.488, and 124.969 billion Won (= 1.070, 0.148, and 0.104 billion US-$), respectively13. 
To summarize, while the number of listed and publicly owned companies might be 
viewed as comparably low from some perspectives, the four German automotive companies 
which were surveyed are all listed at German stock exchanges (and at some exchanges 
abroad as well). Although the German stock markets might be perceived as narrow and thin, 
the four companies we surveyed are major corporations with considerable volume and 
turnover of their stock trading. Thus, they benefit from the top-heaviness of German share 
markets, indicated above, and can be termed public companies. In contrast, the stock 
exchange impacts the four Korean auto companies much less. Turnover and market 
capitalization of the Korean auto companies are either low or they are not even publicly 
listed in the stock exchange as it is the case for Daewoo. According to our terminology, 
these companies are therefore private ones. 
Referring to the concept of argumentation rationality, we argue that in the case of public 
corporations (German corporate governance), management perceives a high degree of 
justification pressure (executed by the shareholders and the capital market). Corporate 
                                                        
13 Source: Daily Official List, 1998. 12.28, Korea Stock Exchange (KSE).  
The corresponding figures in US-$ are based on the exchange rates at the end of December 
1998. 
ARGUMENTATION RATIONALITY IN THE  
GERMAN AND KOREAN AUTOMOTIVE  INDUSTRY 
 
35
management intends to satisfy the interests of their shareholders because otherwise 
dissatisfied shareholders will sell their corporate shares or they will engage in corporate 
governance by dismissing failing managers (Dietl 1998, p. 38). Thus, corporate executives 
are under pressure to put forward arguments that support the assumed impact of 
management measures in question on corporate performance. Because of this high 
justification pressure, managers in public corporations tend to prepare their decisions 
carefully in order to have arguments at hand to justify their decisions. Consequently, the 
high degree of justification pressure could be reflected in comparatively detailed accounts. 
On the contrary, it can be expected that in private corporations (Korean corporate 
governance), the perceived degree of justification pressure is lower. Therefore, managers in 
private corporations could tend to prepare their decisions less carefully. They need less 
convincing power for carrying out their decisions because shareholders are strongly tied to 
their companies and the capital market is less influential. Thus, the Korean governance 
structure with its lower justification pressure could result in less informative accounts with 
lower argumentation rationality. 
In short, we posit the following hypothesis about the influence of the independent 
variable corporate governance: 
H5: Since companies are more public in Germany than in Korea, we expect German 
management accounts to be more argumentation rational than the Korean ones. 
 
 
6. DATA BASE AND RESULTS 
 
In order to test on an empirical basis the hypotheses just explained, the following data 
from the German and the Korean automotive industry were used. In Germany, 138 accounts 
on the four German companies BMW, Daimler-Benz, Porsche and Volkswagen of the years 
1990–1997 were selected (see v. Werder 1999, p. 682). 
The Korean sample also contained four motor companies – Hyundai, Daewoo, Kia and 
Ssangyong – of which 218 accounts were selected for the same period of time. In both 
countries, these accounts were taken from annual reports, business magazines and 
newspapers. They report on three types of major change actions: (1) reorganization of the 
overall company structure, (2) restructuring of central staff departments, and (3) personnel 
changes in the management board. The distribution of these accounts among the types of 
change action and on the four companies in each country is shown in Table 5. 
The majority of the German accounts deals with overall reorganizations (46.4 %) and 
personnel changes in the management board (42.8 %). Only 15 out of 138 accounts 
(10.9 %) picked out central staff restructurings as their central theme (Table 5). This 
distribution indicates that structural and personnel changes at the top level gain more public 
attention than central staff restructurings which are located on lower levels of the hierarchy 
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  Germany 
BMW 2 5 25 32 
Daimler-
Benz 
51 3 12 66 
Porsche 9 0 1 10 









    Korea 
Hyundai 39 6 3 48 
Daewoo 66 0 0 66 
Kia 63 6 3 72 










The Korean accounts are far more concentrated on overall reorganization issues than the 
German ones (89.9 % compared to 46.4 %). This difference is mainly due to the 
management practices of the Korean firms, in which top managers are mostly the largest 
shareholders who are not held responsible by the shareholders for the firms’ performance. 
Thus, personnel changes are rare. Also, Korean companies at least during the researched 
period were not accustomed to the restructuring of the staff. It was only in the wake of the 
economic crisis that started in November 1997 that any major restructuring of the staff was 
made in Korean firms. On the other hand, most of the Korean firms including the 
automobile companies in our sample went global during the same period. They 
aggressively invested abroad, through construction of new plants and acquisition of 
factories. This trend in that era echoed the Korean government’s declaration to globalize its 
economy, system, and modus operandi, resulting in major reorganization of the overall 
corporate structures in many firms. 
The total number of accounts, hence, is 356. The argumentation rationality of these 
accounts was coded by German and Korean scholars familiar with the theoretical concept 
of argumentation rationality and the measurement instrument. In order to spot check the 
reliability of the rationality analysis, some accounts were coded separately by more than 
one person. Although comparing these results did not reveal major deviations, a strict 
systematic test of the intercoding reliability is still to be carried out and makes further 
research necessary. 
The rationality analysis applied the simplified scale of argumentation rationality 
introduced above (Figure 2, section B.). On this basis, the main level of argumentation 
rationality was determined for each single account. Additionally, in the case of detail-
founded change actions the extent of impartiality, depth, and breadth were coded using the 
five-level semantic differential of each item. 
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7. INTRA-COUNTRY ANALYSES 
 
The intra-country analyses have been carried out with regard to two principle questions. 
The first question concerned the relative frequency of the main levels of argumentation 
rationality. The second question asked for correlation between impartiality, depth and 
breadth in the case of a detail-founded reasoning. Both these questions were analyzed by 
change actions and by companies in order to find out whether or not change action-specific 





7.1.1. Analysis of the Main Levels of Argumentation Rationality 
 
With the exception of the (very complex) qualified-founded change action, all main levels 
of argumentation rationality could be found in the German accounts (v. Werder 1999, p. 
682). The relative frequency of these levels varies with the type of change action (Table 6). 
 
Table 6:  Main Levels of Argumentation Rationality by Type of Change Action in the   











































     
 
The majority of the reorganizations of the overall company structure and of the 
restructuring of central staff departments were detail-founded. It is interesting to note that 
there are no significant differences between these two types of change actions. 57.8 % of 
the accounts on overall reorganizations and 60.0 % of the accounts on central staff 
restructuring were detail-founded. 4.7 % of the overall reorganizations and 6.7 % of the 
staff restructurings were unfounded, 37.5 % and 33.3 %, respectively, global-founded. 
On the contrary, only 18.6 % of the personnel changes in the management board were 
detail-founded. Rather, the vast majority of the personnel changes were only global-
founded (55.9 %) or even unfounded (25.4 %). These findings indicate that decisions about 
structural matters are more thoroughly discussed (at least in the published accounts) than 
the more sensitive personnel issues. Thus, it can be expected that the share of detail-
founded accounts would have been higher if the topic of personnel changes would have 
been addressed less frequently. 
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Analyzing the influence of the company on the main level of argumentation rationality 
is not easy because the accounts are not proportionally distributed among the companies ( 
Table 7). Referring to the pure number, 66 out of 138 accounts (48 %) concern Daimler-
Benz. This reflects the multitude of management measures that were carried out at this 
company with its weighty strategic redirections and personnel changes in the 1990s, on the 
one hand, and the publicly paid attention to these important means, on the other. Only 10 
accounts (7 %) report on Porsche which can be interpreted as a size effect because Porsche 
is by far the smallest of the four German companies in our sample. 
 
Table 7:    Main Levels of Argumentation Rationality by Company (and Type of  
                 Change Action) in the German Accounts 
 





(O); (C); (P) 
5 
(16 %) 
0; 1; 4 
(0 %; 20 %; 16 %) 
23 
(72 %) 
2; 4; 17 
(100 %; 80 %; 68 %) 
4 
(13 %) 
0; 0; 4 
(0 %; 0 %; 16 %) 
32 
(23 %) 
2; 5; 25 




(O); (C); (P) 
4 
(6 %) 
3; 0; 1 
(6 %; 0 %; 8 %) 
27 
(41 %) 
17; 1; 9 
(33 %; 33 %; 75 %) 
35 
(53 %) 
31; 2; 2 
(61 %; 67 %; 17 %) 
66 
(48 %) 
51; 3; 12 
(80 %; 20 %; 20 %) 
Porsche 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
0 
(0 %) 
0; 0; 0 
(0 %; –; 0 %) 
6 
(60 %) 
5; 0; 1 
(56 %; –; 100 %) 
4 
(40 %) 
4; 0; 0 
(44 %; –; 0 %) 
10 
(7 %) 
9; 0; 1 
(14 %; 0 %; 2 %) 
Volkswagen 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
10 
(33 %) 
0; 0; 10 
(0 %; 0 %; 48 %) 
6 
(20 %) 
0; 0; 6 
(0 %; 0 %; 29 %) 
14 
(47 %) 
2; 7; 5 
(100 %;100 %;24%) 
30 
(22 %) 
2; 7; 21 
(3 %; 47 %; 36 %) 
∑ 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
19 
(14 %) 
3; 1; 15 
(5 %; 7 %; 25 %) 
62 
(45 %) 
24; 5; 33 
(38 %; 33 %; 56 %) 
57 
(41 %) 
37; 9; 11 
(58 %; 60 %; 19 %) 
138 
(100 %) 
64; 15; 59 
(100 %;100 %;100 %) 
(O): Overall Reorganization; (C): Restructuring Central Staff; (P): Personnel Changes in 
the Management Board 
 
Furthermore, the analysis is difficult because sometimes there are only very few 
accounts on a specific change action for a company (Table 7). While only 2 accounts on 
overall reorganization report on BMW, 9 on Porsche and 2 on Volkswagen, 51 out of all 64 
reorganization accounts concern Daimler-Benz. A bit more balanced are the 15 accounts on 
staff restructuring (5 on BMW, 3 on Daimler-Benz, 0 on Porsche and 7 on Volkswagen) 
and the 59 accounts on management changes (25 on BMW, 12 on Daimler-Benz, 1 on 
Porsche and 21 on Volkswagen).  
More importantly for revealing company impacts, the ratios between the number of 
accounts about the three change action types diverge. While the vast majority of the 
Daimler-Benz (77 %) and of the Porsche (90 %) accounts concerns overall reorganizations, 
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personnel matters are the most frequent topic of the analyzed accounts on BMW (78 %) and 
Volkswagen (70 %). The comparably high numbers of accounts on management changes in 
the cases of BMW and Volkswagen, respectively, are – inter alia – caused by the 
resignation of the prominent BMW CEO in 1993 as well as by the separation between a 
group management board (“Konzernvorstand”) and a brand management board 
(“Markenvorstand”) at Volkswagen.  
If the companies nevertheless are ranged with respect to their specific argumentation 
behavior (Table 7), Volkswagen has the most detail-founded accounts for all types of 
change actions (100 % each of 2 accounts on overall reorganization and of 7 accounts on 
staff restructuring, 24 % of 21 accounts on management changes), followed by Daimler-
Benz (61 % of 51 accounts on overall reorganization, 67 % of 3 accounts on staff 
restructuring and 17 % of 12 accounts on management changes). These two companies also 
underline the finding that decisions about the overall structure and about staff departments 
are more thoroughly argued for than personnel issues are. 
The low argumentation rationality of accounts on personnel changes is also evidenced 
by BMW and by Porsche. Only 16 % of the corresponding 25 BMW accounts were detail-
founded and the single account on this issue of Porsche was just global-founded. However, 
these two companies also show a comparably low argumentation rationality profile with 
regard to overall reorganizations and staff restructuring. None of the 2 BMW accounts on 
overall reorganizations and the minority (44 %) of the 9 Porsche accounts on this issue 
were detail-founded. Similarly, the 5 BMW accounts on central staff restructuring were 
either unfounded (20 %) or just global-founded (80 %). Of course, the small number of 
accounts limits the interpretability of this observation. 
Another interesting result of the analysis is that the similarity of the argumentation 
rationality main levels for accounts on overall reorganizations and staff restructurings can 
also be found on the firm level. In the case of Volkswagen, 100 % of the overall 
reorganization accounts and 100 % of the staff accounts are detail-founded. For Daimler-
Benz, 6 % of the overall reorganizations (0 % of the staff restructurings) are unfounded, 
33 % (33 %) global-founded and 61 % (67 %) detail-founded. In the case of BMW, no 
account on either overall reorganization or staff restructuring is detail-founded, while a 
global-foundation exists in 100 % of the reorganization accounts and in 80 % of the staff 
accounts14. 
 
7.1.2. ANALYSIS OF THE DETAIL-REASONING 
 
Regarding the extent of impartiality, depth and breadth of detail-founded accounts, the 
empirical findings only disclose 23 different patterns out of the 125 theoretically possible 
combinations. Of these 23 argumentation patterns, only 8 were found more than once and 
only 5 more than twice. As has been shown in v. Werder (1999, p. 683), with three 
exceptions (0i–1d–2b, 0i–2d–2b, and 0i–2d–3b) all of the empirical patterns can be grouped 






                                                        
14 Porsche is left out since no account on central staff restructuring is in the sample. 
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The A-Form encompasses the patterns 0i–0d–0b (found 15 times), 0i–0d–1b (7 times), and 
1i–0d–0b (4 times). With (26 out of 57 accounts =) 46 % the A-Form is the most frequent 
type of reasoning in the German detail-founded accounts (Table). The B-Form type 
includes the patterns 1i–0d–1b (7 times), 1i–0d–2b (3 times), 2i–0d–1b (1 time), 2i–0d–2b (1 
time), 2i–0d–3b (1 time), 4i–0d–2b (2 times), and 4i–0d–3b (1 time). With (16 out of 57 
accounts =) 28 % the B-Form is the second most frequent detail-reasoning type found. The 
family of the C-Form is composed of the patterns 2i–0d–0b (2 times), 3i–0d–0b (1 time), 3i–
0d–1b (1 time), 3i–1d–1b (1 time), and 4i–0d–0b (1 time). It has been found in (6 out of 57=) 
11 % of all detail-founded accounts. Finally, the D-Form is represented by the patterns 0i–
2d–0b (1 time), 0i–3d–1b (1 time), 0i–3d–2b (1 time), 0i–4d–2b (2 times), and 1i–2d–1b (1 time). 
It is with 11 % as frequent as the C-Form type of detail-reasoning. 
 
Table 8: Forms of Detail-Reasoning by Type of Change Action in the German Accounts 
 




  (38 %) 
12                      
   (32 %) 
5
  (14 %) 
4 
  (11 %) 
2 
   (5 %) 
37 




  (44 %) 
2 
   (22 %) 
1 
  (11 %) 
1 
  (11 %) 
1 
  (11 %) 
9 




  (73 %) 
2 
   (18 %) 
0 
   (0 %) 
1 
  (9 %) 
0 
   (0 %) 
11 
   (19 %) 
∑ 26 
  (46 %) 
16 
   (28 %) 
6 
   (11 %) 
6 
  (11 %) 
3 
   (5 %) 
57 
  (100 %) 
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This rank-ordering between the A-, B-, C- and D-Form in principle also holds for the 
different types of change action (Table 8). Out of all 37 detail-founded accounts on overall 
reorganization, 38 % show the A-Form, 32 % the B-Form, 14 % the C-Form, 11 % the D-
Form (and 5 % others). Correspondingly, of the 9 detail-founded accounts on staff 
restructuring 44 % mirror the A-Form, 22 % the B-Form, 11 % the C-Form, 11 % the D-
Form (and 11 % others). As far as the 11 detail-founded accounts on changes in the 
management board are concerned, the A-Form is even more predominant. It represents 
73 % of these 11 accounts, followed by the B-Form (18 %) and the D-Form (9 %). The 
missing of the C-Form here emphasizes the already stated finding, that personnel issues 
normally are not discussed in great detail in accounts and especially not in a controversial 
manner. Furthermore, the predominance of the A-Form underlines the observed lower 
extent of argumentation rationality in general which can also claim validity within the 
group of detail-founded accounts. 
Because of the small number of detail-founded accounts that were identified for BMW 
and Porsche we will not attempt to interpret the distribution of the different forms of detail-
reasoning among the four companies in greater detail. The analysis of the patterns of detail-
reasoning by companies, however, shows an interesting deviation from the companies’ 
ranking in terms of the main level of argumentation rationality. Volkswagen has the highest 
percentage of detail-founded accounts as compared to Daimler-Benz, Porsche and BMW 
(see p. 45). Yet, Daimler-Benz has the lowest percentage of accounts with the low-rational 
A-Form (37 %, compared to 50 % for Volkswagen, 50 % for Porsche and 100 % for BMW), 
the highest percentage of B-Form accounts (34 %, compared to 25 % for Porsche, 21 % for 
Volkswagen and 0 % for BMW) and the highest percentage of C-Form accounts (14 %, 
compared to 7 % for Volkswagen and 0 % each for BMW and Porsche). Only with respect 
to the D-Form, Porsche (with 25 % of its detail-founded accounts) and Volkswagen (14 %) 
can be rated higher than Daimler-Benz (9 %) and BMW (0 %). For information purposes, 
these distributions are summarized in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Forms of Detail-Reasoning by Company (and Type of Change Action)  
               in the German Accounts 
 
 A-Form B-Form C-Form D-Form Others ∑ 
BMW 
(O); (C); (P) 
100 % 
0; 0; 100 % 
0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 100 % (n=4) 
(n=0; 0; 4) 
Daimler-Benz 
(O); (C); (P) 
37 % 
36; 100; 0 % 
34 % 
36; 0; 50 % 
14 % 
16; 0; 0 % 
9 % 
6; 0; 50 % 
6 % 
6; 0; 0 % 
100 % (n=35) 
(n=31; 2; 2) 
Porsche 
(O); (C); (P) 
50 % 
50; 0; 0 % 
25 % 
25; 0; 0 % 
0 % 25 % 
25; 0; 0 % 
0 % 100 % (n=4) 
(n=4; 0; 0) 
Volkswagen 
(O); (C); (P) 
50 % 
50; 29; 80 % 
21 % 
0; 29; 20 % 
7 % 
0; 14; 0 % 
14 % 
50; 14; 0 % 
7 % 
0; 14; 0 % 
100 % (n=14) 
(n=2; 7; 5) 
∑ 
(O); (C); (P) 
46 % 
38; 44; 73 % 
28 % 
32; 22; 18 % 
11 % 
14; 11; 0 % 
11 % 
11; 11; 9 % 
5 % 
5; 11; 0 % 
100 % (n=57) 
(n=37; 9; 11) 
(O): Overall Reorganization; (C): Restructuring Central Staff; (P): Personnel Changes in 









7.2.1. Analysis of the Main Levels of Argumentation Rationality 
 
We carried out the analysis of the accounts on Korean automobile companies during the 
period of 1990 through 1997, in a similar fashion with that of the German counterpart. As 
mentioned above, the survey resulted in 218 accounts of four motor companies – Hyundai, 
Daewoo, Kia and Ssangyong. Among those 26 (11.9 %) accounts were classified as 
unfounded, and 44 (20.2 %) as global-founded, resulting in 148 (67.9 %) accounts as detail-
founded. Again, no qualified-founded change action was found (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Main Levels of Argumentation Rationality by Type of Change Action in the    
                 Korean Accounts 
 
 Unfounded Global-founded Detail-founded         ∑ 
Overall 
Reorganization 
  23 
    (11.7 %) 
   40 
    (20.4 %) 
   133 
      (67.9 %) 
196 
   (89.9 %) 
Restructuring 
Central Staff 
    2 
    (16.7 %) 
     3 
     (25.0 %) 
       7 
      (58.3 %) 
 12 
    (5.5 %) 
Personnel 
Changes 
    1 
    (10.0 %) 
     1 
     (10.0 %)  
       8 
      (80.0 %) 
 10 
    (4.6 %) 
∑   26 
    (11.9 %) 
   44 
      (20.2 %) 
   148 
      (67.9 %) 
218 
   (100 %) 
 
The distribution of the main levels over the three change actions was more or less even. 
The numbers of unfounded accounts for overall reorganization, restructuring central staff, 
and personnel changes in the management board were 23, 2, and 1 respectively, while the 
numbers of global-founded accounts for the corresponding categories were 40, 3, and 1 
respectively. These ratios are not much different from the numbers of detail-founded 
accounts for the corresponding categories that were 133, 7, and 8. 
Calculating ratios of these three main levels of argumentation rationality in each change 
action, we have similar results (Table 9). Among the 196 accounts that reported overall 
reorganizations, 23 (11.7 %) were unfounded, 40 (20.4 %) global-founded, and 133 
(67.9 %) detail-founded. Among the 12 accounts that reported restructuring in central staff, 
2 (16.7 %) were unfounded, 3 (25.0 %) global-founded, and 7 (58.3 %) detail-founded. 
Finally, among the 10 accounts that reported personnel changes in management board, 1 
(10.0 %) was unfounded, 1 global-founded (10.0 %), and 8 (80.0 %) were detail-founded. 
The accounts of the restructuring in central staff and the personnel changes in the 
management board are too small in number to make any meaningful conclusion in this 
regard. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the type of change action impacts the main 
levels of argumentation rationality. 
 Similarly with the German accounts, examining the influence of the company on the 
main level of argumentation rationality is not easy, due to the uneven distribution of the 
accounts among the companies. Furthermore, there were only very few accounts on either 
restructuring of central staff or on personnel changes in the management board (Table 10). 
Analyzing nevertheless the company-specific accounts by the main level of argumentation 
rationality, we have fairly even distributions. Though the numbers are again too small to 
draw statistically proved implications from the statistics, it is, based on this empirical basis, 
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at least impossible to identify salient differences concerning the main levels of 
argumentation rationality dependent on the specific company. 
 
Table 10: Main Levels of Argumentation Rationality by Company (and Type of  
                 Change Action) in the Korean Accounts 
 
 Unfounded Global-founded Detail-founded ∑ 
Hyundai 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
8 
(17 %) 
5; 2; 1 
(13 %; 33 %; 33 %) 
12 
(25 %) 
10; 1; 1 
(26 %; 17 %; 33 %) 
28 
(58 %) 
24; 3; 1 
(62 %; 50 %; 33 %) 
48 
(22 %) 
39; 6; 3 
(20 %; 50 %; 30 %) 
Daewoo 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
8 
(12 %) 
8; 0; 0 
(12 %; –; –) 
15 
(23 %) 
15; 0; 0 
(23 %; –; –) 
43 
(65 %) 
43; 0; 0 
(65 %; –; –) 
66 
(30 %) 
66; 0; 0 
(34 %; 0 %; 0 %) 
Kia 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
4 
(6 %) 
4; 0; 0 
(6 %; 0 %; 0 %) 
15 
(21 %) 
13; 2; 0 
(21 %; 33 %; 0 %) 
53 
(74 %) 
46; 4; 3 
(73 %; 66 %; 100 %) 
72 
(33 %) 
63; 6; 3 
(32 %; 50 %; 30 %) 
Ssangyong 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
6 
(19 %) 
6; 0; 0 
(21 %; –; 0 %) 
2 
(6 %) 
2; 0; 0 
(7 %; –; 0 %) 
24 
(75 %) 
20; 0; 4 
(71 %; –; 100 %) 
32 
(15 %) 
28; 0; 4 
(14 %; 0 %; 40 %) 
∑ 
 
(O); (C); (P) 
26 
(12 %) 
23; 2; 1 
(12 %; 17 %; 10 %) 
44 
(20 %) 
40; 3; 1 
(20 %; 25 %; 10 %) 
148 
(68 %) 
133; 7; 8 
(68 %; 58 %; 80 %) 
218 
(100 %) 
196; 12; 10 
(100 %; 100 %; 100 %) 
(O): Overall Reorganization; (C): Restructuring Central Staff; (P): Personnel Changes in 
the Management Board 
 
7.2.2. Analysis of the Detail-Reasoning 
 
Concentrating on the detail-founded accounts, we may have a more salient picture of 
the type of detail-reasoning by change action types and companies. Regarding the extent of 
impartiality, depth and breadth of detail-founded accounts, the empirical findings disclosed 
21 different patterns out of the 125 theoretically possible combinations. This number was 2 
less than the 23 in the German database. Of these 21 combinations, 9 were found only once, 
3 were found twice. In concurrence with the philosophy of the four types of reasoning 
introduced above (section B.), 16 patterns (118 accounts or 80 % out of all 148 detail-
founded accounts, respectively) were grouped into these four clusters. For this, the forms 
were slightly modified without contradicting the idea of their definition (Figure 5). These 
extended forms just do not cover the remaining five patterns: 0i–0d–2b (found 6 times), 0i–
1d–1b (17 times), 0i–1d–2b (2 times), 1i–1d–0b (3 times), and 1i–1d–1b (2 times). Hence, 30 
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The A-Form encompasses the patterns 0i–0d–0b (found 33 times), 0i–0d–1b (38 times), 
0i–1d–0b (9 times), and 1i–0d–0b (1 time). With 81 (55 %) accounts out of the total 148, the 
A-Form is the most frequent type of detail-reasoning in the Korean accounts as well (Table 
11). The B-Form type includes the patterns 1i–0d–1b (19 times), 1i–0d–2b (1 time), 2i–0d–1b 
(3 times), as well as 2i–0d–2b, 2i–1d–2b, 3i–1d–2b, 3i–1d–3b, and 4i–1d–4b, each of which is 
found once. With 28 accounts, this type represents 19 % of the total number of 148 detail-
founded accounts. The family of the C-Form is composed of the patterns 2i–0d–0b (1 time), 
2i–1d–1b (5 times) and 3i–1d–1b (2 times). With 8 accounts, this type represents 5 % of the 
total 148 detail-founded accounts. Finally, the D-Form is represented by 0i–2d–0b, which 
was found only once in the case of Kia. 
A closer look at the accounts that could not be grouped into these four types of detail-
reasoning reveals some interesting similarities between the more frequent patterns. The 
combination 0i–0d–2b (found 6 times) mirrors a reasoning which is comparably broad. 
However, it does not fit into the B-Form because it is partial at the same time. Furthermore, 
the patterns 0i–1d–1b (17 times) and 0i–1d–2b (2 times) represent decisions which are 
prepared quite thoroughly with respect to the determinants of depth and breadth but (again) 
not with respect to the one of impartiality. Thus, these three patterns, which anyhow 
represent 83 % out of the accounts termed others, have in common that they represent 
reasonings which are comparably broad or broad and deep, respectively, but partial. 
Possibly, they could be grouped into a new cluster characterizing such a type of detail-
reasoning. While examining this feasibility requires further research, it shall already be 
noted that the frequency of these patterns in the Korean accounts is in line with our 
theoretical hypotheses because we expected the Korean accounts to be less impartial. 
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Table 11:Forms of Detail-Reasoning by Type of Change Action in the Korean Accounts 
 






















































The rank among the four types of reasoning was A, B, C, and D for all the data (Table 
11). For different types of change action, however, the extreme skewness matters. On 
overall reorganization, 133 accounts were distributed among the A-Form (71 accounts), B-
Form (27 accounts), C-Form (6 accounts), D-Form (1 account), and the others (26 
accounts). For restructuring in central staff, 4 of the total 7 detail-founded accounts 
belonged to the A-Form, one to the B-Form, and two accounts to the others. In the case of 
personnel changes in the management board, 6 out of the total 8 detail-founded accounts 
belonged to the A-Form, while the remaining two accounts had to be termed as others. 
 
Table 12: Forms of Detail-Reasoning by Company (and Type of Change Action) in the  
                 Korean Accounts 
 
 A-Form B-Form C-Form D-Form Others ∑ 
Hyundai 
(O); (C); (P) 
21 % 
13; 67; 100 % 
50 % 
54; 33; 0 % 
14 % 
17; 0; 0 % 
0 % 14 % 
17; 0; 0% 
100 % (n=28) 
(n=24; 3; 1) 
Daewoo 
(O); (C); (P) 
63 % 
63; 0; 0 % 
12 % 
12; 0; 0 % 
7 % 
7; 0; 0 % 
0 % 19 % 
19; 0; 0 % 
100 % (n=43) 
(n=43; 0; 0) 
Kia 
(O); (C); (P) 
60 % 
61; 50; 67 % 
11 % 
13; 0; 0 % 
2 % 
2; 0; 0 % 
2 % 
2; 0; 0 % 
25 % 
22; 50; 33 % 
100 % (n=53) 
(n=46; 4; 3) 
Ssanyong 
(O); (C); (P) 
67 % 
65; 0; 75 % 
13 % 
15; 0; 0 % 
0 % 0 % 21 % 
20; 0; 25 % 
100 % (n=24) 
(n=20; 0; 4) 
∑ 
(O); (C); (P) 
55 % 
54; 57; 75 % 
19 % 
20; 14; 0 % 
5 % 
6; 0; 0 % 
1 % 
1; 0; 0 % 
20 % 
20; 29; 25 % 
100 % (n=148) 
(n=133; 7; 8) 
(O): Overall Reorganization; (C): Restructuring Central Staff; (P): Personnel Changes in 
the Management Board 
 
 Analyzing the types of reasoning by company intriguing differences were discovered 
(Table 12). In the case of Hyundai, the A-Form was found in 6 accounts, the B-Form in 14 
accounts, C-Form in 4 accounts, and the others in 4 account. In the case of Daewoo, the 
numbers for each of the types were 27, 5, 3, 0 and 8 others. In the case of Kia, the numbers 
were 32, 6, 1, 1 and 13 others. In the case of  Ssangyong, the numbers were 16, 3, 0, 0 and 
5 others. It is interesting to note that Hyundai as the market leader has obviously the lowest 
share of accounts belonging to the A-Form (21 %) although concerning the main levels we 
were not able to identify accounts on Hyundai as being more argumentation rational than 
accounts on the other Korean companies. Contrary, the frequency of detail-reasoned 
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accounts seemed to be lower in the case of Hyundai (Table 10). Thus, one could conjecture 
that Hyundai’s management selects only some specific measures which they spend special 
attention for and which they reason more thoroughly than their competitors do. To avoid 
misunderstandings, these thoughts are speculative in their nature, of course. Nevertheless, 
they could open up discussions and reveal possible lines for future research about the 
relationship between the level of argumentation rationality and company performance. For 
this purpose, further theory development might include deeper case studies of single 
companies and might address the differences in reasoning patterns of successful and failing 
managers. We will take up these aspects at the end of this paper when perspectives for 
future research are elaborated more systematically (section E.). 
 
 
8. INTER-COUNTRY ANALYSES 
 
The inter-country analysis was carried out in two steps. First, we compared the 
distribution of the main levels of argumentation rationality between the German and the 
Korean data. Subsequently, we analyzed the detail-founded share of the accounts. These 
analyses aimed to determine whether or not the German accounts were more argumentation 
rational than their Korean counterparts. We did not focus on subgroups of our data because 
the empirical basis was too small for analyzing them reasonably and for drawing 
meaningful conclusions. Thus, when interpreting the results of the aggregated inter-country 
comparisons we had to be aware of change action specific and company specific 
differences that the German intra-country analysis in particular had disclosed. 
Firstly, concerning the main levels of argumentation rationality, there are no remarkable 
differences in the frequency of the extreme main levels which limit both sides of the 
continuum of (more or less) argumentation rational management solutions. A qualified-
founded change action was identified neither in the German sample nor in the Korean one. 
Furthermore, the relative number of unfounded change actions is very similar (13.8 % of 
the German accounts and 11.9 % of the Korean accounts, respectively). Yet, the share of 
detail-founded accounts is much lower in the German sample. 41.3 % of the German 
accounts compared with 67.9 % of the Korean ones were detail-founded. This finding 
contradicts our hypotheses developed above. However, for interpreting this result one has 
too look more carefully at the data and the insights of the intra-country analyses carried out 
before. 
In the case of the German automobile industry, we revealed significant impacts by the 
type of change action on the main level of argumentation rationality. More precisely, 
personnel changes in the management board were reported to be prepared much less 
thoroughly in the published accounts. This point is in particular weighty, because the 
number of accounts on this specific type of change action was comparably high in the 
German data. 42.8 % of the German accounts dealt with personnel changes (see again 
Table 6). In contrast, there were only few Korean accounts on personnel changes (4.6 % of 
218 accounts), of which the majority was detail-founded anyway (Table 9). Therefore, the 
comparison of the aggregated data presents a distorted picture of the differences in 
preparing management decisions. As mentioned above, the share of detail-founded 
accounts in the German data can be expected to be higher if the data would have contained 
fewer accounts on personnel changes in the management board. 
Nevertheless, even if we reduce our analysis to the accounts on overall reorganizations 
and staff restructurings the share of detail-founded measures reported on in the German 
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sample is lower than the one in the Korean data (58.2 % compared to 67.3 %). Although 
this difference is smaller, it apparently contradicts our propositions. Therefore, concerning 
the main levels of argumentation rationality our hypotheses are to be rejected on the basis 
of the scrutinized data. 
Secondly, concerning the level of detail-reasoning we carried out two sample Gauß-
tests in order to find out whether the suggested differences exist within the group of detail-
founded accounts. Results of comparing the three determinants of argumentation rationality 
are summarized in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Inter-Country Analysis of Detail-Founded Accounts 
 
 Germany Korea 
Number of detail-founded accounts                   57               148 
Impartiality (mean)               0.88              0.43 
Depth (mean)               0.42              0.31 
Breadth (mean)               0.88              0.79 
Impartiality (standard deviation)               1.21              0.80 
Depth (standard deviation)               1.02              0.48 
Breadth (standard deviation)               0.91              0.67 
Correlation (impartiality, depth)             –0.23              0.23 
Correlation (impartiality, breadth)               0.26              0.42 
Correlation (depth, breadth)               0.37              0.10 
Two sample Gauß-test 
Impartiality               0.994766 
Depth               0.785236 
Breadth               0.742154 
 
When focussing the detail-founded accounts in our samples, coding results indicate a 
higher degree of argumentation rationality in the German data compared with the Korean 
ones. Interestingly, the higher degree of argumentation rationality can be observed in each 
of the three dimensions. Hence, on average, the German detail-founded accounts are more 
impartial, deeper, and broader than their Korean counterparts. Testing the statistical 
significance of these observations which concur with our hypotheses is only successful in 
the case of the impartiality dimension, however (p < 0.01). Concerning the determinants of 
depth and breadth, the differences are too small in order to be proofed to be significant. 
Hence, our two-tiered analysis discloses that the studied phenomena are more 
ambiguous than our general hypotheses make suggest. The results indicate that two 
divergent aspects have to be differentiated. While from a macro perspective viewing the 
main levels of argumentation rationality Korean accounts seem to be more argumentation 
rational than their German counterparts, the relations invert in the case of detail-founded 
solutions. 
German management accounts, therefore, are not more argumentation rational than the 
Korean ones in general. Instead, German automobile managers pick out some topics and 
measures which they investigate more thoroughly – even more thoroughly than their 
Korean counterparts, particularly with respect to the determinant of impartiality. Thus, 
these problem solutions are more impartial, broader, and deeper, respectively, than the 
Korean reasoning is. However, further research is necessary for identifying those aspects 
                                            AXEL V. WERDER, DONG-SUNG CHO & TILL TALAULICAR  
 
48
and characteristics of a management problem which make the requirement of a (more or 
less) detail-founded solution. 
 
 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The study described in this paper is obviously still in an embryonic phase. Nevertheless, 
already the premature results reported here underline the value of the concept of 
argumentation rationality for cross-country analyses and point at interesting fields for 
further research. Limitations of the study have been mentioned above and concern in 
particular the intercoding reliability as well as the sample size. The former marks an 
intriguing task for further research. Controlling intercoding reliability is difficult because 
the procedure for coding the argumentation rationality of accounts is a complex process 
which requires business know-how and also a deep understanding of the coders for the 
measurement concept. Besides repeated coding of the data by the same individual or 
measuring the intracoder reliability, respectively (e.g., Webb and Pettigrew 1999, p. 606), 
double coding by several coders or coding teams and subsequently comparing their coding 
results is a practicable, but very costly way for reliability testing. We only used this method 
in spot checks because of the time effort that coding the argumentation rationality of 
accounts needs. In principle, of course, it is feasible to extent these comparisons and to 
measure the percentage agreement (e.g., Bettman and Weitz 1983, p. 174) as well as – in 
the case of larger separately coded samples – the correlation between the results different 
coders yield (e.g., D’Aveni and MacMillan 1990, p. 642 f.).  
The latter limitation – sample size – becomes relevant when focussing on specific levels 
of argumentation rationality and studying the impact of selected variables. While the total 
number of 356 accounts seems to be considerably high, the subgroups of main level, (form 
of) detail-reasoning, country, company, and change action specific accounts can sometimes 
be viewed as too small for drawing meaningful conclusions. Therefore, it was impossible to 
unravel the inter-country analysis for separating the company and change action specific 
effects systematically. 
Contradictions to our hypotheses can also result from neglected influences. Thus, a first 
line of further research might elaborate the effects of additional factors on the extent of 
argumentation rationality. E.g., the importance of a change action will matter, too. 
Apparently, it makes a difference whether changes in the top management team concern a 
prominent CEO who is in the limelight or another member of the board who is hardly 
known to the public. The structural and strategic range of restructuring measures can vary, 
too. We may assume evidence that management measures will be prepared (and accounted 
for) the more thoroughly the more important they are perceived to be. Controlling this 
contingency, however, requires a procedure for ranking the (perceived) importance of 
change actions. Thereby, it might be necessary to differentiate between the perceptions of 
top management team members, shareholders and other stakeholders. Additionally the 
importance might be interpreted in terms of time pressure that management faces when 
preparing its decisions. However, we currently lack such a ranking procedure the 
development of which is a complex effort on its own. 
Further research might also address the impact of time. Our study controlled this 
influence by restricting the data collection to a limited period of time (1990–1997). When 
extending this time frame it might be possible to identify an increasing extent of 
argumentation rationality in published accounts over time caused – inter alia – by changes 
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in the competitive situation and in the investors’ relations as well as by the growing public 
attention to and media observation of corporate affairs. 
Albeit the necessity of further research we have proofed the usefulness of our 
measurement concept for international management studies. Furthermore, our results 
validate the need for more differentiated research questions and designs which are sensitive 
to divergent influences and micro phenomena. Apparently, the differences between the 
decision preparation of German and Korean managers cannot be captured in a simple black-
white manner. Our findings suggest that German management accounts are not more 
argumentation rational than their Korean ones in general. Instead, one has to differentiate 
between a macro view on the main levels of argumentation rationality and a micro one for 
elaborating the detail-founded solutions with more accuracy. Only in the case of detail-
founded change actions the hypothesized relations have been confirmed. Therefore, 
German detail-founded management accounts turned out to be more argumentation rational 
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